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Abstract
Among the various forms of malware, botnets are becoming the
major threats on the Internet that use for many attacks, such as 
spam,  distributed  denial-of-service  (DDoS), identity  theft and 
phishing. NetFlow protocol is a standard for monitoring Internet 
traffic  that developed  by  Cisco Systems. Therefore, it  is very 
effective  to identifying  unusual  programs generating  illegal 
traffic, or additional load, and also identification of botnet. The 
main goal of this paper is to show a novel approach for botnet 
detection using data records of NetFlow protocol and clustering 
technique. Our approach for C&C bot detection is to examine 
flow  characteristics  such  as  IP,  port,  packet  event  times  and 
bytes per packet for evidence of botnet activity. First we collect 
the flows and refined records based on basic filtering, white list 
and black list. The remaining records produce a cluster and the 
cluster refined based on patterns, policies, and another cluster 
that generated based on reported events, alerts and activities of 
network security sensors. We apply hierarchical clustering that
allows  us  to  build  a  dendrogram,  i.e.,  a tree  like graph  that 
encodes the relationships among the bots.  The merged cluster
modifies based on rules and combined with other information 
about detected infected nodes to reduce false positive. 
Keywords: NetFlow  Protocol,  C&C  Botnet,  Hierarchical
Clustering, Correlation, Anomaly Detection, Network Security.
1. Introduction
The term “Bot” is derived from the word “Robot” that is 
an intelligent software application that runs via worms, 
trojans or  other malicious  codes  to p erform a  group  of
cyber operations over the Internet. The other name of bot 
is zombie. A large number of bots form a connected group 
called  a  “Botnet”  that under  the  remote  control  of  a 
human operator called a “Botmaster”. 
According  to  the  explanation  in  [1],  botnets  can  be 
classified to four categories: IRC, HTTP, P2P and DNS. 
The IRC bot is a centralized topology that a central point 
sends messages between clients [2]. In connection phase, 
the bot program establishes an IRC channel, and connects 
the  zombie to the command and control (C&C)  server. 
Upon establishment of C&C channel, the zombie becomes 
a part of attacker’s botnet army. Then, the actual botnet 
command  and  control  activities  will  be  started.  The 
botmaster uses the IRC channel to disseminate commands 
to his bot army. Bots receive and execute commands sent 
by botmaster. The IRC channel enables the b otmaster to 
remotely c ontrol  the  action  of  large  number  of  bots  to 
conduct various illicit activities [3]. 
In the http bot, the command and control (C&C) is http 
based  [1].  In H TTP-based  botnets,  bots  contact  C&C 
server  periodically t o  fetch  commands.  The  HTTP 
protocol  is  a  popular  communication  method  by  botnet 
which  is difficult to be  detected. Botnets usually b ypass 
security devices using the HTTP protocol [4].
Centralized  control  of  botnets  offers  a  single  point  of 
failure for the botnet. So, more stable architectures will be 
used  by  botnet  operators,  P2P  architecture [1].  P2P 
communication system has several important advantages 
over  centralized  networks.  It  is  much  harder to d isrupt 
and the design  of P2P systems are more complex. This 
means  that  the  compromise  of  a  single  bot  does  not 
necessarily mean the loss of the entire botnet. But, there 
are typically no guarantees on message delivery or latency 
[2]. 
When  bots  used  DNS  as  a  communication  channel  to 
connect  to botmaster,  called  the  DNS  botnets. Recent 
DNS botnets are so difficult to be detected, because using 
new fluxing features. Fast flux (FF), a mechanism that a 
set of IP addresses change frequently corresponding to a 
unique  domain  name. Domain flux  (DF), a mechanism 
that  a set of  domain names are generated automatically 
and periodically corresponding to a unique IP address [5]. 
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task. There are mainly many categories of botnet detection 
and  tracking  methods.  The  detection  techniques  are 
classified  into f our  classes  in  [3]:  signature-based, 
anomaly-based, Domain Name System (DNS)-based and 
mining-based techniques. 
According  to  [4],  there  are  two  approaches  of  botnet 
detection, one is signatures based method and the other is 
based on anomaly.  In [6], detection  methods are traffic 
based, anomaly based, nick name based, independent of 
C&C controls and spam mail based.
In this research, the main data-source for botnet detection 
is  NetFlow records.  NetFlow  protocol  has  the  task  of 
network traffic analysis and plays a vital role in network 
troubleshooting, performance improvement and increased 
availability of members. The protocol stores information 
about network  nature, such as who, when and how has
used network traffic. In last, the SNMP protocol used for 
monitoring  network  traffic.  SNMP  however a ggregates 
information on  a  very high level  (i.e. network interface 
throughput or device uptime), but, a lot of information is 
lost. The SNMP protocol can't specify that who and how 
much  has  used  bandwidth.  So, the  NetFlow protocol 
designed for collects information of network layer [7]. 
A  flow  is  a  unidirectional  stream  of  packets  that  pass 
through  a  network  element  and  share  a  common set of 
attributes [8]. NetFlow version 9 is the latest release from 
Cisco and was also selected by the IETF as the basis for 
the  IPFIX  standard. NetFlow  protocol  is  useful  in 
identification  of  agents  producing  an additional  load  to 
the network. Therefore it is very effective in identifying 
unusual programs such as botnet. 
Several  mechanisms have  been  proposed  for  botnet 
detection;  One  of  these  mechanisms, uses NetFlow 
protocol. Low volume of data, simplicity of computation, 
lower f alse  positive  and  being  online  are s ome  of  the 
advantages of this mechanism against other mechanisms. 
Network flow records high-level descriptions of Internet 
connections, but not the actual data transferred [9]. 
Various methods are used to analyze NetFlow data. One 
of these methods is clustering. Bots have a specific traffic 
pattern to communicate over the network, like ports, size 
of  the  packets  in  each d irection,  and  duration.  So,  if 
various data mining techniques combined with clustering 
analysis, specific patterns of behavior in network traffic 
are identified and can be found bots. 
We  proposed  a  method for  C&C  bot  detection that 
contains  5 steps: First,  we  collect  network  traffic  and 
events.  Second,  records refine based  on  basic  filtering, 
white  list  and  black  list. Third,  we use  clustering 
technique to c reate two  clusters of remaining flows and 
events.  Forth,  we  refine the  flows cluster  based  on 
patterns, policies, and events cluster. In last step, we use 
rules  and  pervious  information to d iscover  correlations 
and certain patterns, and report the bot cluster(s). 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows. 
Section 2 discusses on related work, defines the scope of 
this  article  and  highlights  innovative  aspects  of  our 
approach. In section 3, the general methodology as well as 
proposed  approach is  described. Finally,  we  offer the 
simulation of our approach in section 4 and conclude in 
section 5.
2. Related Work
Botnet detection and tracking has been a major research 
topic  in  recent  years.  Different  solutions  have  been 
proposed in different sources. Traditionally, botnets have 
mainly been identified in several ways. According to the 
explanation  in  [3],  botnet  detection  techniques  can b e 
classified  as  being  signature-based,  anomaly-based,  DNS-
based,  and  mining-based.  Several  of  the  prevalent  data 
types  that  used  for b otnet  detection  and  tracking  have 
DNS  data,  NetFlow  data,  packet  tap  data,  address 
allocation data, honeypot data and host data [2]. 
According  to  [10],  bot  detection  mechanisms contain 
infiltration,  C&C  server  hijack,  syntactic,  horizontal 
correlation, vertical correlation, host-based and network-
based.  An  addition,  botmaster  detection  mechanisms 
contain  marking,  logging  and  stepping-stone  detection 
that explained in [10]. 
In this paper, data source is NetFlow data. NetFlow is a 
traffic profile monitoring technology developed by Darren 
Kerr and Barry Bruins at Cisco  Systems, back in 1996. 
NetFlow  data  provides  important  information  about 
network conversations and behaviors. Each unique flow is 
recorded by the network devices or probes, and the flows 
are then reported to a data collection server [11]. NetFlow 
can  help  network managers  to  monitor suspect Internet 
botnet’s activities by analyzing the source data from the 
router [12]. NetFlow data represents information gathered 
from the network by sampling traffic flows and obtaining 
information regarding source and destination IP addresses 
and port numbers [13].
A  survey t hat  aims  at  analyzing,  classifying  and 
comparing  the  most  relevant  network-based  botnet 
detection  methods,  can  see  in  [14].  Generally,  botnet 
detection  methods using  NetFlow are  classified  in  five
categories: correlation, clustering, IRC, machine learning 
and DNS. 
Correlation: Disclosure, a large-scale,  wide-area botnet 
detection  system  incorporates  a  combination  of  novel 
techniques to overcome the challenges imposed by the use 
of  NetFlow  data.  Several  groups  of  features  allow 
Disclosure  to  reliably  distinguish  C&C  channels  from 
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explained in [16], is analytical strategy of matching the 
dialog  flows  between i nternal  assets  and  the  broader 
Internet  as  dialog-based  correlation,  and  contrast  this 
strategy to other intrusion detection and alert correlation 
methods. A same approach presented for C&C bot, in [17].
Clustering: in this approach, a clustering scheme with a 
set of  traffic features design to determine group similar 
traffic  patterns.  BotMiner  defines  a  botnet  as  a 
coordinated  group  of  malware  instances  that  are 
controlled  via  C&C  communication  channels.  In 
BotMiner,  detection  framework  clusters  similar 
communication traffic and similar malicious traffic, and 
performs cross cluster correlation to identify the hosts that 
share  both  similar  communication  patterns  and  similar 
malicious activity patterns [18]. BotTrack is an approach 
based on clustering and PageRank algorithm that analyzes
communication behavioral patterns and to infer potential 
botnet  activities  [19].  An a pproach  proposed  based  on 
PageRank and MapReduce in [20].
IRC: Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is a concept that allows 
users to communicate with each other in real time. There 
exist several separate networks of so called IRC servers, 
which provide users with a connection to IRC. A common 
method of an attacker to communicate with the botnet is 
to u se  IRC.  Rishi  is  an  approach  to d etect  IRC 
characteristics  of  infected  machines  that  explained in 
[21].  There  are  more  methods  for d etect  IRC  bot  that 
explained in [22], [23], [24] and [25].
Machine  Learning: Reference  [26]  uses  machine 
learning techniques to identify the command and control 
traffic of IRC-based botnets. 
DNS: A  survey presented in [5], aims to classify botnet 
detection methods. There is a method that uses DNS data 
and traffic  network  to d etect  malicious  hosts  that 
explained in [27].
In  summary,  the  automatic  detection  of  botnets  is  a 
challenge and demands for a different approach. We fill 
this gap by designing a method to detect C&C channels 
based on traffic analysis and data mining techniques. 
Proposed approach uses clustering technique to create two 
clusters  of  flows  and  events.  In a ddition,  it  uses  of  a 
correlation  engine to  combine clusters information. The 
result  cluster  refines  based  on  rules  and  pervious 
information to s pecify bot cluster(s). The approach uses 
clustering and correlation benefits that proposed in other 
papers. In addition, this approach adds a rule-based logic 
and information combination to reduce false positive. 
3. Proposed Approach 
In this section, we  discuss on proposed approach. First, 
we  present  basic  definitions.  Second, we  offer n etwork 
configuration  for  collect  flows  and  events.  Third,  we 
express proposed approach and explain different parts of 
the algorithm. 
3.1 Basic Definitions
Definition1. A  C&C  botnet uses  a protocol  to 
communicate instructions and reports, signal a bot’s state 
and availability as well as transmit bot program updates 
between one or more bots and the controlling entity, the 
bot master [28]. 
Definition2. A flow is a unidirectional stream of packets 
that pass through a network element and share a common 
set of attributes [8].
Definition3. Two  flows  are s aid  to b e  correlated  when 
they exhibit one or more common properties [22]:
• They are the product of similar applications.
• There is a causal relationship.
• There is one transmitter and multiple receivers.
Definition4. Types of Correlation [15]:
• Vertical  Correlation:  detecting  command  and 
control  (C&C)  channels  used  by  botmasters  to 
communicate with each infected machine.
• Horizontal Correlation: botnet detection is based 
upon  patterns  of  crowd b ehavior  exhibited  by 
collections  of  bots  in  response  to b otmaster 
commands.
3.2 Flows and Events Collectors
The  sensor  is the device or p rogram that  captures  data 
from your network and forwards it to the collector. The 
collector  is  software  that  receives  sensor  records  and 
writes them to disk. For collecting flows and events, we 
must configure two collectors on network. Flow Collector 
saves flow records that capture from the network. Event 
Collector  saves  alert  records  that  reported by  security
sensor, such as IDS, Firewall, Antivirus and etc. Figure 
(1)  shows  configured network  that  collects  flows  and 
events and we will describe in continue.  Also, figure (2) 
illustrates  our  methodology  for  C&C  botnets  detection 
that will explain in section 3.3.
3.2.1 Flow Collector
The biggest flow collectors on Internet are cflowd, flowd
and flow-tools. Flow-tools, the most commonly used flow 
management tool kit. To install the latest version of flow-
tools  from  source,  download  the  source  code  from 
http://code.google.com/p/flow-tools/, and  extract it. Now 
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for t he  current  compiling  instructions.  The  process 
probably i ncludes  the  steps  configure,  make,  and make 
install [29].
The flow-capture program listens on a specified UDP port 
for incoming flow exports. It then captures the data and 
writes flow  records to disk. It configure on a special IP 
and port. Many network hardware manufacturers, such as 
Cisco,  include  flow  export  in  their  products. Configure 
NetFlow on a Cisco router interface. 
Fig. 1 Network configuration
Fig. 2 An anomaly methodology for detect C&C botnets 
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All  the  network  events  from  security s ensors sent at  a 
central location. Events collector allows us to get events 
from remote sensors and store them in a local event log 
on the collector computer. All data in the forwarded event 
is  saved  in  the  Event  Collector.  Open  Source  Security 
Information  Management  (OSSIM)  is  an  open  source 
security  information  and  event  management  system, 
integrating  a  selection of  tools designed  to  aid network 
administrators  in  computer  security,  intrusion  detection 
and prevention. We configure security sensors on OSSIM, 
such that, sensors sent events to interface that connected 
to OSSIM. 
3.3 Methodology 
In this section, we explain a new botnet detection anomaly 
approach that the goal detects same patterns belong to the 
same botnet  in network. Botnets have similar behaviors 
during  a  time  period.  Our  approach  finds  similarity
behavior of hosts using NetFlow information and reported 
events through a predefined time period. 
We  proposed  an  anomaly m ethodology  for C &C  bot 
detection that contains below steps: 
1. Collecting network traffic and events 
2. Refining records based  on basic filtering, white 
list and black list
3. Creating two  clusters  of  remaining  flows  and 
events 
4. Refining clusters based on patterns and policies, 
and merging clusters information together
5. Using rules and pervious information to discover 
correlations  and certain patterns, and  reporting
the bot cluster(s)
In  first  step,  we  collect  NetFlow  data  and  events  of 
sensors  and  store  in  Flow  and  Event  Collectors  that 
explained in section 3.2. 
In next step, we refine NetFlow and event records based 
on basic filtering, black list and white list. Before this, we 
must  unify  events.  Unification  Events  level  aims  to
unifying  events  from  all  security  sensors in  a  single 
format on just one console. We will be able to observe all 
security events  for a  p articular  moment  in  time  on the
same screen and in the same format. So, we will need to
organize  a  translator  and  a  database.  The  translator 
unifies  all  network  events  that  coming  from  different 
sensors,  in  same  format  and  stores  them  in  the  same 
database. 
In the basic filtering level, we filter out all the flows that 
are  not  directed  from internal  hosts  to e xternal  hosts. 
Therefore, we ignore the flows related to communications 
between internal hosts and flows initiated from external 
hosts towards internal hosts. We also filter out flows that 
are not completely established, i.e., these flows are mainly 
caused by scanning activity (e.g., when a host sends SYN 
packets without completing the TCP hand-shake) [18]. In 
white list  filtering, we  filter  out  those  flows  whose 
destinations  are  well known as  legitimate  servers  (e.g., 
Google,  Yahoo!) that  will  unlikely  host  botnet  C&C 
servers. In  black  list  filtering, we  filter out those flows 
whose destinations are well known as malicious servers.
In third step, we  create two clusters of remaining flows 
and  events.  Clustering  technique  enables  us  to  identify 
groups of similar C&C flows and events in our data set. 
We  use  clustering  for  three main  reasons.  Often,  the 
message lengths of the messages in a C&C flow are not 
equally static throughout several C&C flows of one botnet, 
but  show  slight deviations  in  a  small  range.  Thus,  we 
need  to  aggregate  similar  flows  and learn  the  range  of
each message’s length in a C&C flow. Second, grouping 
similar  C&C  flows  into  clusters  allows us  to  build  a 
centroid for each cluster which represents the fingerprint 
of this cluster’s C&C flows. Third, the similar behaviors 
of  same  botnets  make  same  events  groups  in  regular 
periods. The  clustering  step  produces  efficient 
representations  that  serve  as  training  data  for  the
subsequent  classification  of  flows.  In  addition,  the 
clustering results  provide  insights  into and measure the 
relationships  between c lusters  of  different  malware 
families [28]. We need to select a clustering method that 
has  above  specification.  This  definition  of  similarity 
between flow and event groups gives us the opportunity to 
apply  hierarchical  clustering. This  allows us  to  build a 
dendrogram,  i.e.,  a  tree  like  graph  (see Fig. 3)  that 
encodes the relationships among the bots. 
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Hierarchical  clustering  is  a  method  of  cluster  analysis 
which seeks to build a hierarchy of clusters. Strategies for 
hierarchical clustering generally fall into two types:
 Bottom-up  approach:  each o bservation  starts  in 
its own cluster, and pairs of clusters are merged 
as one moves up the hierarchy. 
 Top-down approach: all observations start in one 
cluster,  and splits  are  performed recursively a s 
one moves down the hierarchy
There are other clustering methods that used in [30], [31] 
and  [32].  Reference  [30]  uses  the s pectral  clustering 
method.  Of c ourse,  references  [18], and  [28]  use 
hierarchical clustering. 
In  next  step,  we  refine  clusters  based  on  patterns and
policies. The clusters combine their information. Patterns 
are  initial  signs  of  a  possible  attack.  In  this  level, we 
attempt  to  determine behavior  patterns of  C&C botnets
that  help  us  identify botmaster, malicious  hosts, path 
taken, and attack behavior and method. We define attack 
behavior as the sequence of attacks and activities carried 
out by  a botmaster on one or more malicious machines.
Policy are sets of conditions, constraints, and settings that 
allow us to designate who is authorized to connect to the 
network and the circumstances under which they can or 
cannot connect. We must survey flow and event clusters to 
see  that flows  are  based  on policies  and events ignore, 
which  policies.  In last level of this step, we  merge two 
cluster  based  on  a  correlation  engine.  The  correlation 
engine executes an operation on input clusters and return 
output cluster. Correlation in our methodology means the 
ability to view all flows and events in all systems in one 
cluster and  in  the  same format  to  improve  detection 
capabilities.  Correlation  improves  reliability,  sensitivity, 
and abstraction. 
In  final step,  we  use  rules and  pervious  information  to 
discover correlations and certain patterns, and report the 
bot cluster(s). We define lists of rules for each sequence of
correlation flows that we expect as behavior C&C botnets.
The  rules  aimed  at  locating  unknown  or  undetectable
attacks,  since patterns  that characterize  them  are 
unavailable. In  last  level,  we  combine  the  new and old 
information to reduce false positive. 
The approach, as an integrated solution, offers monitoring 
at any level, from the lowest to the highest. We proposed 
an  anomaly  detector  that  the  detection  does  in  multi 
stages: 
 Basic filtering, black list and white list
 Patterns and polices
 Correlation engine
 Rules and pervious information
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In this section, we evaluate our approach. For this end, we 
simulate a network by GNS3. We configure a network on 
GNS3  that  infected  to  Zeus  bot.  Zeus  is  computer 
malware that used to steal banking information by man-
in-the-browser, keystroke logging and form grabbing. In 
this paper, we  use centralized Zeus botnets that all bots 
only c onnect  to a botmaster  and receive  command and 
control traffic from only a server. Flow characteristics that 
we need to detect Zeus botnet, fall into two categories: 
 Static  characteristics:  source and destination IP 
address, source and destination port numbers and 
protocol
 Dynamic  characteristics:  packet  event  times, 
bytes  per  packet,  periodic  throughput  samples, 
post and get
We need post and get, because Zeus uses HTTP. We show 
configured network on GNS3 in Fig. 4. We send a copy of 
network traffic to OSSIM on the interface of Cisco router
that IP has 192.168.100.1. OSSIM can collect flows and 
events and stores in database. We setup IDS on OSSIM. 
So,  we  have  a  flow  database  and  a  unification  event 
database. Figure (5) shows part of the network traffic in a 
special time period. For next step, we ignore black list and 
white list levels. In basic filtering, we filter out the flows 
related  to  communications  between  internal  hosts and 
flows initiated from external hosts towards internal hosts.
Fig. 4 Network simulation on GNS3 
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Various  botnets  have  different  behavior  patterns  on 
network.  We  create  flow  cluster  based  on  number  of 
packets, bytes per packet, duration, get and post, because 
Zeus is an unknown bot for me, before we detect it and 
understand its behavior patterns. Also, we do not policy 
level, because have no policy for the network. 
Events cluster can’t help us, because Zeus uses HTTP. We 
modified the flow cluster in correlation engine and go to 
next  step.  In r ules  level,  according  to  Fig.  5,  rules
understand that a special pattern exists in traffic. We have 
two  important  clusters  that  have  similar  specification. 
Some flow records of this clusters show in fig. 6 and fig. 
7. 
Fig. 6 Some flow records of cluster 1
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Fig. 8 Behavior pattern of Zeus bot
You  can see  get and post pattern of Zeus bot  in fig. 8.  
Bots  usually c onnect  to  botmaster  for  a  few  seconds  in 
special  periods.  Bots  have  same  behavior  in  different 
periods.  We  can  see  records with  same  specification  in 
cluster  1.  According  to  what  we  know  about  botnets, 
define rules. So, rules level reports cluster 1 as bot cluster, 
because  we  predefine  this  specification  as  bot  in  rules 
level. 
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown a methodology for anomaly 
detection of C&C botnets that incorporates a combination 
of novel techniques to overcome the challenges imposed 
by  the  use  of  NetFlow  data  and  events.  The  approach 
detects  botnets  in  multi  stages,  so  we  expect  to r educe 
false positive. Bots have same behavior on network that 
they d istinguish  from normal  traffic. So, we  can create 
number  of  hierarchical  clusters  of  network  flows  and 
events  and  find  similar  behavior  and  detect  botnet 
cluster(s) based on basic filtering, black list and white list, 
patterns,  polices,  correlation  engine,  rules  and  pervious 
information. 
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